IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fednsr/460.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The information value of the stress test and bank opacity

Author

Listed:

Abstract

We investigate whether the ?stress test,? the extraordinary examination of the nineteen largest U.S. bank holding companies conducted by federal bank supervisors in 2009, produced the information demanded by the market. Using standard event study techniques, we find that the market had largely deciphered on its own which banks would have capital gaps before the stress test results were revealed, but that the market was informed by the size of the gap; given our proxy for the expected gap, banks with larger capital gaps experienced more negative abnormal returns. Our findings suggest that the stress test helped quell the financial panic by producing vital information about banks. Our findings also contribute to the academic literature on bank opacity and the value of government monitoring of banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald P. Morgan & Stavros Peristiani & Vanessa Savino, 2010. "The information value of the stress test and bank opacity," Staff Reports 460, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:460
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr460.html
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr460.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. O'Hara, Maureen & Shaw, Wayne, 1990. "Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being "Too Big to Fail."," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1587-1600, December.
    2. Beverly Hirtle & Jose A. Lopez, 1999. "Supervisory information and the frequency of bank examinations," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 5(Apr), pages 1-20.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Acharya, Viral V. & Berger, Allen N. & Roman, Raluca A., 2018. "Lending implications of U.S. bank stress tests: Costs or benefits?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 58-90.
    2. Kuo-Wei Hsiao & Zhengyi Jiang, 2015. "The Pre- and Post-Crisis Stress Testing in the Banking Sector — A Literature Review," Global Credit Review (GCR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(01), pages 77-97.
    3. Vives, Xavier & Cespa, Giovanni, 2011. "Expectations, Liquidity, and Short-term Trading," CEPR Discussion Papers 8303, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Flannery, Mark J. & Kwan, Simon H. & Nimalendran, Mahendrarajah, 2013. "The 2007–2009 financial crisis and bank opaqueness," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 55-84.
    5. repec:fip:fedcwp:13-12 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Dissem, Sonia & Lobez, Frederic, 2020. "Correlation between the 2014 EU-wide stress tests and the market-based measures of systemic risk," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    7. Peter V. Egly & David W. Johnk & André Varella Mollick, 2018. "Bank net interest margins, the yield curve, and the 2007–2009 financial crisis," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(1), pages 12-32, January.
    8. Joel Shapiro & David Skeie, 2015. "Information Management in Banking Crises," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(8), pages 2322-2363.
    9. Dmitry Orlov & Pavel Zryumov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2023. "The Design of Macroprudential Stress Tests," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 36(11), pages 4460-4501.
    10. Mark D. Flood & Jonathan Katz & Stephen J. Ong & Adam Smith, 2013. "Cryptography and the economics of supervisory information: balancing transparency and confidentiality," Working Papers (Old Series) 1312, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    11. Douglas J. Elliott & Greg Feldberg & Andreas Lehnert, 2013. "The History of Cyclical Macroprudential Policy in the United States," Working Papers 13-08, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    12. Alvarez, Fernando & Barlevy, Gadi, 2021. "Mandatory disclosure and financial contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    13. Durrani, Agha & Ongena, Steven & Ponte Marques, Aurea, 2024. "Decoding market reactions: The certification role of EU-wide stress tests," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    14. Covas, Francisco B. & Rump, Ben & Zakrajšek, Egon, 2014. "Stress-testing US bank holding companies: A dynamic panel quantile regression approach," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 691-713.
    15. Jungherr, Joachim, 2018. "Bank opacity and financial crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 157-176.
    16. Durrani, Agha & Ongena, Steven & Ponte Marques, Aurea, 2022. "The certification role of the EU-wide stress testing exercises in the stock market. What can we learn from the stress tests (2014-2021)?," Working Paper Series 2711, European Central Bank.
    17. Gary Gorton, 2015. "Stress for Success: A Review of Timothy Geithner's Financial Crisis Memoir," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 53(4), pages 975-995, December.
    18. Sahin, Cenkhan & de Haan, Jakob & Neretina, Ekaterina, 2020. "Banking stress test effects on returns and risks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    19. Quijano, Margot, 2014. "Information asymmetry in US banks and the 2009 bank stress test," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 203-205.
    20. Petrella, Giovanni & Resti, Andrea, 2013. "Supervisors as information producers: Do stress tests reduce bank opaqueness?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5406-5420.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ippolito, Filippo & Peydró, José-Luis & Polo, Andrea & Sette, Enrico, 2016. "Double bank runs and liquidity risk management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 135-154.
    2. Kwan, Simon H., 2003. "Impact of deposit rate deregulation in Hong Kong on the market value of commercial banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(12), pages 2231-2248, December.
    3. Ma, Richie Ruchuan & Xiong, Tao & Bao, Yukun, 2021. "The Russia-Saudi Arabia oil price war during the COVID-19 pandemic," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    4. Acharya, Viral V. & Yorulmazer, Tanju, 2007. "Too many to fail--An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-31, January.
    5. Buch, Claudia M. & Dominguez-Cardoza, Angélica & Völpel, Martin, 2021. "Too-big-to-fail and funding costs: A repository of research studies," Technical Papers 01/2021, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    6. Javed Ahmed & Christopher Anderson & Rebecca Zarutskie, 2015. "Are the Borrowing Costs of Large Financial Firms Unusual?," Working Papers 15-10, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    7. Philip Swicegood & Jeffrey A. Clark, 2001. "Off‐site monitoring systems for predicting bank underperformance: a comparison of neural networks, discriminant analysis, and professional human judgment," Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(3), pages 169-186, September.
    8. anonymous, 1999. "Using subordinated debt as an instrument of market discipline," Staff Studies 172, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    9. Jan Bartholdy & Glenn Boyle & Roger Stover, 2004. "Deposit insurance and the stock market: evidence from Denmark," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(6), pages 567-578.
    10. Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2010. "Liquidity, Bank Runs, and Bailouts: Spillover Effects During the Northern Rock Episode," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 37(2), pages 83-98, June.
    11. Menz, Klaus-Michael, 2010. "Market discipline and the evaluation of Euro financial bonds--An empirical analysis," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 315-328, September.
    12. Pilar Gómez-Fernández-Aguado & Antonio Partal-Ureña & Antonio Trujillo-Ponce, 2013. "Evaluating the effects of the EU directive proposal for risk-based deposit insurance premiums in Spain," Working Papers 13.01, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Financial Economics and Accounting (former Department of Business Administration).
    13. Andrea Zaghini, 2014. "Bank Bonds: Size, Systemic Relevance and the Sovereign," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(2), pages 161-184, June.
    14. Raquel de F. Oliveira & Rafael F. Schiozer & Lucas A. B. de C. Barros, 2011. "Too Big to Fail Perception by Depositors: an empirical investigation," Working Papers Series 233, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    15. Fratianni, Michele & Giri, Federico, 2017. "The tale of two great crises," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 5-31.
    16. Schnabel, Isabel & Weder di Mauro, Beatrice & Schäfer, Alexander, 2016. "Bail-in Expectations for European Banks: Actions Speak Louder than Words," CEPR Discussion Papers 11061, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Schäfer, Alexander & Schnabel, Isabel & Weder di Mauro, Beatrice, 2016. "Bail-in Expectations for European Banks: Actions Speak Louder than Words," CEPR Discussion Papers 11061, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Cristian Barra & Anna Papaccio, 2024. "A parametric approach to institutional quality and bank cost inefficiency in diversity context: The case of Italy," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(3), pages 723-759, September.
    19. Agostino Capponi & Xu Sun & David D. Yao, 2020. "A Dynamic Network Model of Interbank Lending—Systemic Risk and Liquidity Provisioning," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(3), pages 1127-1152, August.
    20. Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Stiroh, 2005. "Too big to fail after all these years," Staff Reports 220, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank capital; bank examinations; Bank holding companies; Risk assessment;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:460. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Gabriella Bucciarelli (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbnyus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.