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Fiscal Dominance

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  • Fernando M. Martin

Abstract

Central banks' resolve and independence are chronically tested by fiscal authorities wishing to impose their desired policies, often leading to socially undesirable economic outcomes. I study how the fiscal and monetary authorities' disagreement over outcomes and their choice of active instruments shape the implementation of policy, dispensing with commitment or first-mover advantage. I characterize the equilibrium for various combinations of active (and correspondingly, passive) instruments, identify which sources of disagreement play a role in each case, and show whether and under what conditions time-consistency problems may disappear in the long-run. When the fiscal authority sets debt levels actively, it may be able to impose its preferences on the central bank, regardless of how monetary policy is conducted. Designing a central bank with a special concern for liquidity markets counteracts this result.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernando M. Martin, 2020. "Fiscal Dominance," Working Papers 2020-040, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 26 Aug 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:88992
    DOI: 10.20955/wp.2020.040
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2005. "A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(3), pages 463-484, June.
    2. Leeper, Eric M., 1991. "Equilibria under 'active' and 'passive' monetary and fiscal policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 129-147, February.
    3. Fernando M. Martin, 2019. "How to Starve the Beast: Fiscal Policy Rules," Working Papers 2019-026, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 08 Aug 2023.
    4. Shouyong Shi, 2006. "Viewpoint: A microfoundation of monetary economics," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(3), pages 643-688, August.
    5. Wallace, Neil, 2001. "Whither Monetary Economics?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(4), pages 847-869, November.
    6. Plantin, Guillaume & Barthélemy, Jean & Mengus, Eric, 2019. "Public Liquidity Demand and Central Bank Independence," CEPR Discussion Papers 14160, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Fernando Martin, 2009. "A Positive Theory of Government Debt," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 12(4), pages 608-631, October.
    8. Stefan Niemann & Paul Pichler & Gerhard Sorger, 2013. "Central Bank Independence And The Monetary Instrument Problem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(3), pages 1031-1055, August.
    9. Shouyong Shi, 2006. "A Microfoundation of Monetary Economics," Working Papers tecipa-211, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    10. Williamson, Stephen & Wright, Randall, 2010. "New Monetarist Economics: Models," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 2, pages 25-96, Elsevier.
    11. Lucas, Robert Jr. & Stokey, Nancy L., 1983. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 55-93.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    discretion; time-consistency; government debt; deficit; inflation; institutional design; political frictions; fiscal dominance; central bank independence; active vs passive policies; unpleasant monetarist arithmetic;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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