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Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk

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  • David Andolfatto

Abstract

This paper studies the optimal maturity structure for government debt when markets for liquidity insurance are incomplete or non-competitive. There is no fiscal risk. Government debt in the model solves a dynamic inefficiency. Issuing debt in short and long maturities solves a liquidity insurance problem, but optimal yield curve policy is only possible if long-duration debt is rendered illiquid. Optimal policy is implementable through treasury operations only--adjustments in the primary deficit are not necessary.

Suggested Citation

  • David Andolfatto, 2020. "Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk," Working Papers 2020-008, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:87863
    DOI: 10.20955/wp.2020.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shi, Shouyong, 2008. "Efficiency improvement from restricting the liquidity of nominal bonds," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(6), pages 1025-1037, September.
    2. Paul A. Samuelson, 1958. "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(6), pages 467-467.
    3. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    4. David Andolfatto, 2021. "Assessing the Impact of Central Bank Digital Currency on Private Banks," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(634), pages 525-540.
    5. Yves Nosbusch, 2008. "Interest Costs and the Optimal Maturity Structure Of Government Debt," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(527), pages 477-498, March.
    6. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1991. "Financial Markets and Financial Crises," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number glen91-1.
    7. George-Marios Angeletos, 2002. "Fiscal Policy with Noncontingent Debt and the Optimal Maturity Structure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 1105-1131.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Andolfatto & Fernando Martin, 2023. "Welfare-enhancing inflation and liquidity premia," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 51, pages 1036-1047, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Maturity structure; yield curves; liquidity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

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