IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedhpr/906.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Is three a crowd? competition among regulators in banking

Author

Listed:
  • Richard J. Rosen

Abstract

In some industries, firms are able to choose who regulates them. There is a long debate over whether regulatory competition is beneficial or whether it leads to a ?race for the bottom.? We introduce another aspect to this discussion. Regulators may desire a ?quiet life?, taking actions intended to minimize the effort they spend on work. Using banking as an example, we test this ?quiet life? hypothesis against other explanations of regulatory behavior. Banks are able to switch among three options for a primary federal regulator: the OCC, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC. We examine why they switch and what the results of switches are. We find support for the hypothesis that competition among regulators has beneficial aspects. Regulators seem to specialize, offering banks that are changing strategy the ability to improve performance by switching regulators. There is also evidence that the ability to switch regulators allows banks to get away from an examiner that desires a quiet life.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard J. Rosen, 2002. "Is three a crowd? competition among regulators in banking," Proceedings 906, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedhpr:906
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. International Monetary Fund, 2006. "Regulatory Capture in Banking," IMF Working Papers 2006/034, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Marcelo Rezende, 2014. "The Effects of Bank Charter Switching on Supervisory Ratings," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2014-20, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Agur, Itai, 2009. "Regulatory Competition and Bank Risk Taking," CEPR Discussion Papers 7524, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Sumit Agarwal & David Lucca & Amit Seru & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(2), pages 889-938.
    5. Feng, Guohua & Zhang, Xiaohui, 2012. "Productivity and efficiency at large and community banks in the US: A Bayesian true random effects stochastic distance frontier analysis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(7), pages 1883-1895.
    6. Ms. Deniz O Igan & Thomas Lambert, 2019. "Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond," IMF Working Papers 2019/171, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Agur, Itai, 2013. "Multiple bank regulators and risk taking," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 259-268.
    8. Mattia Girotti & Federica Salvadè, 2022. "Competition and Agency Problems Within Banks: Evidence from Insider Lending," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3791-3812, May.
    9. Mr. Martin Cihak & Mr. Jörg Decressin, 2007. "The Case for a European Banking Charter," IMF Working Papers 2007/173, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Richard J. Rosen, 2005. "Switching primary federal regulators: is it beneficial for U.S. banks?," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, vol. 29(Q III), pages 16-23.
    11. Adams, Renee B. & Santos, Joao A.C., 2006. "Identifying the effect of managerial control on firm performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 55-85, April.
    12. Fraccaroli, Nicolò & Sowerbutts, Rhiannon & Whitworth, Andrew, 2020. "Does regulatory and supervisory independence affect financial stability?," Bank of England working papers 893, Bank of England.
    13. W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, 2004. "Regulating housing GSEs: thoughts on institutional structure and authorities," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, vol. 89(Q 2), pages 87-102.
    14. Gong, Di & Huizinga, Harry & Li, Tianshi & Zhu, Jigao, 2023. "Goodhart’s law in China: Bank branching regulation and window dressing," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    15. Mr. Itai Agur & Mr. Sunil Sharma, 2013. "Rules, Discretion, and Macro-Prudential Policy," IMF Working Papers 2013/065, International Monetary Fund.
    16. Demyanyk, Yuliya & Loutskina, Elena, 2016. "Mortgage companies and regulatory arbitrage," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 328-351.
    17. Fraccaroli, Nicolò, 2019. "Supervisory governance, capture and non‑performing loans," Bank of England working papers 820, Bank of England.
    18. Guohua Feng & Bin Peng & Xiaohui Zhang, 2017. "Productivity and efficiency at bank holding companies in the U.S.: a time-varying heterogeneity approach," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 179-192, December.
    19. Hans Degryse & Sanja Jakovljević & Steven Ongena, 2015. "A Review of Empirical Research on the Design and Impact of Regulation in the Banking Sector," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 423-443, December.
    20. Agur, Itai, 2009. "Regulatory Competition and Bank Risk Taking," CEPR Discussion Papers 7524, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Pablo Paniagua, 2017. "The institutional rationale of central banking reconsidered," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 231-256, September.
    22. Nicoletti, Allison, 2018. "The effects of bank regulators and external auditors on loan loss provisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 244-265.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank supervision;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedhpr:906. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lauren Wiese (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbchus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.