IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/feddwp/95-01.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

An equilibrium analysis of central bank independence and inflation

Author

Listed:
  • Gregory W. Huffman

Abstract

A dynamic equilibrium model is constructed to analyze the implications of different degrees of central bank independence. In the main model, agents are permitted to vote on the desired inflation and labor taxes to finance government spending. Multiple perfect-foresight equilibria arise, and one of them exhibits fluctuations in output, investment, and the inflation rates as a result of permitting agents to vote. If, instead of having agents vote each period on these parameters, inflation and labor taxes in the model are set at fixed levels, these fluctuations do not arise, and a lower inflation rate can appear.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Gregory W. Huffman, 1995. "An equilibrium analysis of central bank independence and inflation," Working Papers 9501, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:feddwp:95-01
    Note: Published as: Huffman, Gregory W. (1997), "An Equilibrium Analysis of Central Bank Independence and Inflation," Canadian Journal of Economics 30 (4): 943-958.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/research/papers/1995/wp9501.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mehdi El Herradi & Jakob Haan & Aurélien Leroy, 2023. "Inflation and the Income Share of the Rich: Evidence for 14 OECD Countries," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 69(1), pages 170-194, March.
    2. Radhika Lahiri & Zivanemoyo Chinzara, 2022. "Institutional reform, technology adoption and redistribution: a political economy perspective," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(2), pages 361-400, August.
    3. Jim Dolmas & Gregory W. Huffman & Mark A. Wynne, 2000. "Inequality, inflation, and central bank independence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(1), pages 271-287, February.
    4. Huffman, Gregory W., 1996. "Endogenous tax determination and the distribution of wealth," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 207-242, December.
    5. Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, 1997. "Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 381-399, August.
    6. Lahiri, Radhika & Ratnasiri, Shyama, 2010. "A political economy perspective on persistent inequality, inflation, and redistribution," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 1199-1210, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:feddwp:95-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Amy Chapman (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbdaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.