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Fragile States and International Support

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  • Paul COLLIER

    (Blavatnik School of Government)

Abstract

Cette étude propose de définir les Etats fragiles par les caractéristiques qui les éloignent de l’Etat d’intérêt commun et de l’autocratie répressive. Les « Failed states » constituent un des plus grands défis du développement car ils ont peu de raisons de tendre vers ces deux formes stables de gouvernance par des mécanismes internes, par la force du marché globalisé ou par l’approche conventionnelle des bailleurs de fonds. Cette étude montre que, sans intervention extérieure impliquant des changements visibles à court terme par la majorité de la population, ces pays ne se rapprocheront jamais des sociétés d’intérêt commun. Elle propose donc un certain nombre de recommandations sur la façon de relever les défis politiques, économiques ou sécuritaires des Etats fragiles. Tout d’abord, la stratégie des bailleurs en matière d’aide aux régimes post-conflits ne doit pas reposer uniquement sur l’instauration de démocraties à élections multipartites car elles sont vouées à l’échec en l’absence de cohésion sociale. La construction d’une identité commune (processus long) est nécessaire au développement harmonieux d’une administration nationale ; mais son absence n’empêche pas de développer un outil décentralisé localement efficace. Cette décentralisation est un moyen unique de préparer calmement le partage du pouvoir absolument nécessaire au développement d’une administration nationale fédératrice et au service de la communauté. Ensuite, la gendarmerie semble être l’outil le plus approprié pour traiter l’aspect local de la réponse sécuritaire ; elle serait idéalement contrôlée par les autorités locales (conseils de villages) avec une forme de partage de cette responsabilité avec l’administration nationale afin d’éviter la création de « baronnies ». La protection contre les menaces extérieures doit être assumée par un outil militaire dont il n’est pas nécessaire qu’il soit national ; il pourrait être soutenu financièrement et logistiquement par la communauté internationale. Enfin, l’économie des Etats fragiles étant typiquement très improductive, il existe beaucoup de moyens d’en augmenter la productivité. Des actions sont techniquement possibles mais elles sont freinées par l’incapacité organisationnelle de l’Etat à les délivrer. Une forme de coopération entre gouvernement et donateurs qui mandateraient un ISA (Independent Service Authority) est une solution envisageable.(Rédigé par Camille Laville)

Suggested Citation

  • Paul COLLIER, 2016. "Fragile States and International Support," Working Papers P175, FERDI.
  • Handle: RePEc:fdi:wpaper:3374
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
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