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The Value of Political Connections in the Post-Transition Period: Evidence from the Czech Republic

Author

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  • Miroslav Palansky

    (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Smetanovo nabrezi 6, 111 01 Prague 1, Czech Republic)

Abstract

This paper analyzes a novel data set on all corporate political donations made in a post-transition country, the Czech Republic, between 1995 and 2014. Using these donations as a proxy for political connections, I assess the relationship between being connected to a political party and the financial performance of the connected firms. In line with the theoretical predictions, I find that firms successfully use political connections to gain advantage over their non-connected peers. The results show that connected firms perform significantly better in the years around the establishment of a connection, and that the effect is stronger for firms that work closely with the public sector. Furthermore, I present evidence that firms that donations seem to represent actual measures of the level of connectedness, and firms that have contributed more outperform other connected firms. I then develop a dynamic approach to match connected firms with their non-connected but otherwise similar peers and conservatively estimate that being politically connected is associated with 20 to 30 % higher profitability than that of non-connected firms. I also find that non-connected firms that receive public money perform similarly to connected firms, suggesting that other sources of connections, such as personal ties, have played a significant role during the post-transition period in the Czech Republic.

Suggested Citation

  • Miroslav Palansky, 2018. "The Value of Political Connections in the Post-Transition Period: Evidence from the Czech Republic," Working Papers IES 2018/13, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Aug 2018.
  • Handle: RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2018_13
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    File URL: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/sci/publication/show/id/5855/lang/cs
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political connections; political donations; firm performance; rent-seeking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis

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