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Posted vs. Negotiated Prices under Incompelte Information

Author

Listed:
  • Natale, P.

Abstract

This paper addresses the issue of selecting pricing institutions in a bilateral monopoly. Suppose a bayer and seller can benefit from exchanging one unit of a good. The selelr is entitled to select the pricing institution. He can either make a take-it-leave-it offer or enter a bargaining game.

Suggested Citation

  • Natale, P., 1996. "Posted vs. Negotiated Prices under Incompelte Information," Discussion Papers 9603, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:exe:wpaper:9603
    as

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    INFORMATION; BARGAINING; PRICING;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D49 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Other
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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