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How do people play against Nash opponents in games which have a mixed strategy equilibrium?

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  • Jason Shachat
  • J. Todd Swarthout

Abstract

We examine experimentally how humans behave when they, unbeknownst to them, play against a computer which implements its part of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We consider two games, one zero-sum and another unprofitable with a pure minimax strategy. A minority of subjects' play was consistent with their Nash equilibrium strategy. But a larger percentage of subjects' play was more consistent with different models of play: equal-probable play for the zero-sum game, and the minimax strategy in the non-profitable game.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason Shachat & J. Todd Swarthout, 2008. "How do people play against Nash opponents in games which have a mixed strategy equilibrium?," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2008-07, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, revised Feb 2011.
    • Handle: RePEc:exc:wpaper:2008-07
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    File URL: http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2008-07.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2008
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2011-04.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2011
    Download Restriction: no
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