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Assortative multisided assignment games. The extreme core points

Author

Listed:
  • F.Javier Martínez de Albéniz

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

  • Carlos Rafels

    (Universitat de Barcelona)

  • Neus Ybern

    (Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya)

Abstract

We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players’ abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained.

Suggested Citation

  • F.Javier Martínez de Albéniz & Carlos Rafels & Neus Ybern, 2019. "Assortative multisided assignment games. The extreme core points," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2019/395, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ewp:wpaper:395web
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/144180
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Assortative market; assignment game; multisided assignment game; core; extreme core allocations.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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