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Unpriced Quality

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Listed:
  • Pascal Courty

Abstract

A monopolist deliberately charges the same price for differentiated products when high quality products are more likely to be allocated to low type consumers under uniform pricing. The argument can explain the use of ‘unpriced quality’ for concert tickets, sport events, and in many other situations.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal Courty, 2009. "Unpriced Quality," Economics Working Papers ECO2009/16, European University Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2009/16
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    2. Sofronis K. Clerides, 2004. "Price Discrimination with Differentiated Products: Definition and Identification," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(3), pages 402-412, July.
    3. Connolly, Marie & Krueger, Alan B., 2006. "Rockonomics: The Economics of Popular Music," Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, in: V.A. Ginsburgh & D. Throsby (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Art and Culture, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 20, pages 667-719, Elsevier.
    4. Miravete, Eugenio, 2007. "The Limited Gains From Complex Tariffs," Working Paper Series 3971, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    5. Richard J. Gilbert & Paul Klemperer, 2000. "An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(1), pages 1-21, Spring.
    6. Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 1.
    7. Phillip Leslie & Alan Sorensen, 2009. "The Welfare Effects of Ticket Resale," NBER Working Papers 15476, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Orbach, Barak Y. & Einav, Liran, 2007. "Uniform prices for differentiated goods: The case of the movie-theater industry," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 129-153.
    9. Armstrong, Mark, 2006. "Price discrimination," MPRA Paper 4693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Holt, Charles A, Jr & Sherman, Roger, 1982. "Waiting-Line Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 280-294, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Price discrimination; second degree price discrimination; queuing; rationing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing

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    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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