IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/eti/dpaper/18084.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Corporate Governance, Employment, and Financial Performance of Japanese firms: A cross-country analysis

Author

Listed:
  • ARIKAWA Yasuhiro
  • INOUE Kotaro
  • SAITO Takuji

Abstract

This study examines whether the sustained lower profitability and market valuation of Japanese firms compared to global peer firms can be explained by the structure of insider dominate board of directors and the employment system which hinders flexible employment adjustments by using cross-country data. Firstly we show that level of outside director ratio and flexibility of employment adjustment both differ consistently across 27 countries in the analyzed period. We show that these two factors significantly explain observed variation of financial performance across countries significantly. In addition, we show that not only do these two factors have significant explanation power over the relatively poor performance of Japanese firms, but also over the better financial performance and growth rate of US firms.

Suggested Citation

  • ARIKAWA Yasuhiro & INOUE Kotaro & SAITO Takuji, 2018. "Corporate Governance, Employment, and Financial Performance of Japanese firms: A cross-country analysis," Discussion papers 18084, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    • Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:18084
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/18e084.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Xuejing Xing & John S. Howe & Randy I. Anderson & Shan Yan, 2017. "Labor Rights, Venture Capital, and Firm Performance," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 46(1), pages 129-154, March.
    2. Caballero, Ricardo J. & Cowan, Kevin N. & Engel, Eduardo M.R.A. & Micco, Alejandro, 2013. "Effective labor regulation and microeconomic flexibility," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 92-104.
    3. Andrei Shleifer & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Rafael La Porta, 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 285-332, June.
    4. Juan C. Botero & Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "The Regulation of Labor," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(4), pages 1339-1382.
    5. Reena Aggarwal & Isil Erel & René Stulz & Rohan Williamson, 2010. "Differences in Governance Practices between U.S. and Foreign Firms: Measurement, Causes, and Consequences," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(3), pages 3131-3169, March.
    6. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    7. Bruno, Valentina & Claessens, Stijn, 2010. "Corporate governance and regulation: Can there be too much of a good thing?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 461-482, October.
    8. Abadie, Alberto & Imbens, Guido W., 2011. "Bias-Corrected Matching Estimators for Average Treatment Effects," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 29(1), pages 1-11.
    9. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2002. "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1147-1170, June.
    10. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
    11. Dahya, Jay & Dimitrov, Orlin & McConnell, John J., 2008. "Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value: A cross-country analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 73-100, January.
    12. Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, 2005. "To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1461-1493, June.
    13. Aggarwal, Reena & Erel, Isil & Ferreira, Miguel & Matos, Pedro, 2011. "Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 154-181, April.
    14. Hiraki, Takato & Ito, Akitoshi, 2009. "Investor biases in Japan: Another pathology of Keiretsu," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 100-124, January.
    15. Ferreira, Miguel A. & Matos, Pedro, 2008. "The colors of investors' money: The role of institutional investors around the world," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 499-533, June.
    16. Byrd, John W. & Hickman, Kent A., 1992. "Do outside directors monitor managers? *1: Evidence from tender offer bids," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 195-221, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Borisova, Ginka & Brockman, Paul & Salas, Jesus M. & Zagorchev, Andrey, 2012. "Government ownership and corporate governance: Evidence from the EU," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 2917-2934.
    2. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, 2012. "The State of Corporate Governance Research," Springer Books, in: Sabri Boubaker & Bang Dang Nguyen & Duc Khuong Nguyen (ed.), Corporate Governance, edition 127, pages 325-346, Springer.
    3. Polovina, Nereida & Peasnell, Ken, 2020. "Do minority acquisitions transfer better corporate governance practices? An analysis of UK's cross-border minority investments," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(3).
    4. Miletkov, Mihail K. & Poulsen, Annette B. & Babajide Wintoki, M., 2014. "The role of corporate board structure in attracting foreign investors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 143-157.
    5. Kim, Hugh & Liao, Rose C. & Wang, Yan, 2015. "Active block investors and corporate governance around the world," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 181-194.
    6. Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al-Faryan, 2021. "The effect of board composition and managerial pay on Saudi firm performance," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 693-758, August.
    7. Aggarwal, Reena & Erel, Isil & Ferreira, Miguel & Matos, Pedro, 2011. "Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 154-181, April.
    8. Enikolopov, Ruben & Petrova, Maria & Stepanov, Sergey, 2014. "Firm value in crisis: Effects of firm-level transparency and country-level institutions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 72-84.
    9. Iliev, Peter & Roth, Lukas, 2018. "Learning from directors' foreign board experiences," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 1-19.
    10. Belkhir, Mohamed & Ben-Nasr, Hamdi, 2016. "Labor protection and the privatization or partial privatization method," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 305-322.
    11. Bruno, Valentina & Claessens, Stijn, 2010. "Corporate governance and regulation: Can there be too much of a good thing?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 461-482, October.
    12. Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2018. "The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: A View from Accounting Research," CEPR Discussion Papers 12775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Liu, Yu & Miletkov, Mihail K. & Wei, Zuobao & Yang, Tina, 2015. "Board independence and firm performance in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 223-244.
    14. Nicola Moscariello & Michele Pizzo & Dmytro Govorun & Alexander Kostyuk, 2019. "Independent minority directors and firm value in a principal–principal agency setting: evidence from Italy," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 23(1), pages 165-194, March.
    15. Art Durnev & Sergei Guriev, 2007. "The Resource Curse: A Corporate Transparency Channel," Working Papers w0108, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    16. Fauver, Larry & Hung, Mingyi & Li, Xi & Taboada, Alvaro G., 2017. "Board reforms and firm value: Worldwide evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 120-142.
    17. Zhang, Qiyu & Zhang, Xiaoxiang & Chen, Ding & Strange, Roger, 2022. "Market discipline or rent extraction: Impacts of share trading by foreign institutional investors in different corporate governance and investor protection environments," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    18. Marc van Essen & J. (Hans) van Oosterhout & Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens, 2013. "Competition and Cooperation in Corporate Governance: The Effects of Labor Institutions on Blockholder Effectiveness in 23 European Countries," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(2), pages 530-551, April.
    19. Cheung, Yan-Leung & Chung, Cheong-Wing & Tan, Weiqiang & Wang, Wenming, 2013. "Connected board of directors: A blessing or a curse?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 3227-3242.
    20. Bell, R. Greg & Moore, Curt B. & Filatotchev, Igor, 2012. "Strategic and institutional effects on foreign IPO performance: Examining the impact of country of origin, corporate governance, and host country effects," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 197-216.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:18084. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: TANIMOTO, Toko (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/rietijp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.