Multiple Lenders, Temporary Debt Restructuring, and Firm Performance: Evidence from contract-level data
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2016-04-30 (Banking)
- NEP-CFN-2016-04-30 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-DCM-2016-04-30 (Discrete Choice Models)
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