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On the farsighted stability of the Kyoto Protocol

Author

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  • Johan Eyckmans

    (K.U.Leuven, C.E.S., Energy, Transport and Environment)

Abstract

This paper investigates the coalitional stability of the 1997~Kyoto Protocol on the emissions of greenhouse gases. Unlike conventional coalition stability tests we assume that potential deviators are farsighted in the sense of Chwe~(1994) and take into account possible subsequent deviations by the remaining players. In the empirical part of the paper, a Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium w.r.t. to the Kyoto coalition is computed with a stylized dynamic integrated assessment model that resembles closely the RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang~(1996). The simulations show that the Kyoto coalition is more stable than suggested by conventional myopic stability concepts but that the stability analysis is very sensitive to the coalitional surplus sharing rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Johan Eyckmans, 2001. "On the farsighted stability of the Kyoto Protocol," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0103, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    • Handle: RePEc:ete:etewps:ete0103
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    File URL: http://feb.kuleuven.be/drc/Economics/misc/ete_workingpapers/ete-wp01-03.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Barbara Buchner & Carlo Carraro, 2004. "Economic and environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 229-248, September.
    2. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(4), pages 391-414, December.
    3. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2008. "Evolution in time of Farsightedly Stable Coalitions: An Application of FUND," Working Papers FNU-162, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2008.
    4. Karp, Larry & Simon, Leo, 2013. "Participation games and international environmental agreements: A non-parametric model," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 326-344.
    5. Maryse Labriet & Richard Loulou, 2008. "How Crucial is Cooperation in Mitigating World Climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 67-94, February.
    6. Dritan Osmani & Richard S J Tol, 2008. "A Short Note on Joint Welfare Maximization Assumption," The IUP Journal of Managerial Economics, IUP Publications, vol. 0(3), pages 22-39, August.
    7. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two," Working Papers FNU-149, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007.
    8. Calvo, Emilio & Rubio, Santiago J., 2013. "Dynamic Models of International Environmental Agreements: A Differential Game Approach," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 6(4), pages 289-339, April.
    9. Karp, Larry S. & Zhao, Jinhua, 2007. "A Proposal To Reform The Kyoto Protocol: The Role Of Escape Clauses And Foresight," CUDARE Working Papers 6857, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    10. Michèle Breton & Michel Keoula, 2012. "Farsightedness in a Coalitional Great Fish War," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 51(2), pages 297-315, February.
    11. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2003. "Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0317, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    12. Marta Biancardi & Giovanni Villani, 2011. "Largest Consistent Set in International Environmental Agreements," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 38(3), pages 407-423, October.
    13. Giovanni Villani & Marta Biancardi, 2011. "Largest Consistent Set in International Environmental Agreements," Quaderni DSEMS 04-2011, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
    14. Marta Biancardi & Andrea Di Liddo, 2008. "International Environmental Agreement: a Dynamic Model of Emissions Reduction," Quaderni DSEMS 13-2008, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    climate change; coalition stability; farsightedness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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