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Strategy proof cost sharing of multiple excludable public goods

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  • Mutuswami, Suresh

Abstract

In a model of cost sharing of multiple excludable public goods, we examine the properties of mechanisms satisfying strategyproofness, no subsidy, outcome non‐bossiness, budget balance, individual rationality and consumer sovereignty. We show that such mechanisms in general will not satisfy the equity property of equal treatment of equals. This contrasts with the single excludable public good case.
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  • Mutuswami, Suresh, 2000. "Strategy proof cost sharing of multiple excludable public goods," Economics Discussion Papers 9992, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:9992
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    File URL: https://repository.essex.ac.uk/9992/
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    1. Mutuswami, Suresh, 2000. "Strategy proof mechanisms for cost sharing," Economics Discussion Papers 9993, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2016. "Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 749-766, April.

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