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Signaling through Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Generalization

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  • Madhuparna Ganguly
  • Rupayan Pal

Abstract

This note shows that the argument of Šaljanin(2017) [Šaljanin, 2017. “Signaling through public antitrust enforcement―, Economics Letters 169, 4 - 6] that public antitrust enforcement complements private investment is robust to allowing public investment in anti-trust enforcement to be productive. However, unlike as in the case of unproductive public investment, over investment in public antitrust enforcement does not necessarily signal that the government is pro-competition: in pooling equilibria either only the anti-competition government or both types of government over invests, whereas in the separating equilibrium only the pro-competition government over invests.

Suggested Citation

  • Madhuparna Ganguly & Rupayan Pal, 2018. "Signaling through Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Generalization," Working Papers id:12734, eSocialSciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:12734
    Note: Institutional Papers
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    Keywords

    Private and public enforcement; Signaling; Antitrust;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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