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Games that Doctors Play Two-layered agency problems in a medical system

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Listed:
  • Johann Behrens
  • Hartmut Kliemt
  • M. Vittoria Levati
  • Werner Güth

Abstract

Medical doctors act as agents of their patients by either treating them directly or referring them to other more or differently specialized doctors, who thereby become "agents of agents". The main aim of this paper is to model central aspects of such two-layered agency relations in the medical sector. On the basis of our model, we draw some tentative conclusions concerning policy issues. In particular, we suggest relying on a strict separation of roles between diagnostic and therapeutic agents with counseling practitioners acting as gate-keepers of the medical system.

Suggested Citation

  • Johann Behrens & Hartmut Kliemt & M. Vittoria Levati & Werner Güth, 2006. "Games that Doctors Play Two-layered agency problems in a medical system," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-02, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2006-02
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    File URL: ftp://papers.econ.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/2006-02.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Schmid, Andreas, 2007. "Incentive Compatibility and Efficiency in the contractual Insurer-Provider Relationship: Economic Theory and practical Implications: The Case of North Carolina," MPRA Paper 23311, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2008.
    2. Berg, Nathan & Biele, Guido & Gigerenzer, Gerd, 2010. "Does consistency predict accuracy of beliefs?: Economists surveyed about PSA," MPRA Paper 26590, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • J40 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - General

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