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Optimal Income Taxation in an Equilibrium Unemployment Model : Mirrlees meets Pissarides

Author

Listed:
  • M. HUNGERBÜHLER
  • E. LEHMANN
  • A. PARMENTIER
  • P. VAN DER LINDEN

Abstract

This paper characterizes optimal non-linear income taxation in an economy with a continuum of unobservable productivity levels and endogenous involuntary unemployment due to frictions in the labor markets. Redistributive taxation distorts labor demand and wages. Compared to the laissez-faire, gross wages, unemployment and participation are lower. Average tax rates are increasing. Marginal tax rates are positive, even the top. Finally, numerical simulations suggest that redistribution is much more important in our setting than in a comparable Mirrlees (1971) setting.
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Suggested Citation

  • M. Hungerbühler & E. Lehmann & A. Parmentier & P. Van Der Linden, 2003. "Optimal Income Taxation in an Equilibrium Unemployment Model : Mirrlees meets Pissarides," Working Papers ERMES 0306, ERMES, University Paris 2.
    • Handle: RePEc:erm:papers:0306
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    File URL: http://www.u-paris2.fr/ermes/doctrav/trav0306
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cyril Hariton & Gwenaël Piaser, 2007. "When Redistribution Leads to Regressive Taxation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 589-606, August.
    2. Etienne Lehmann & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2007. "On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(5), pages 867-884, October.
    3. Belan, Pascal & Carré, Martine & Gregoir, Stéphane, 2010. "Subsidizing low-skilled jobs in a dual labor market," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 776-788, October.
    4. Boone, Jan & Bovenberg, Lans, 2006. "Optimal welfare and in-work benefits with search unemployment and observable abilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 165-193, January.
    5. Mathias, HUNGERBUEHLER, 2004. "The impact of Union Power on the Optimal Income Tax Schedule," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2004034, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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