Diverse Opinions and Obfuscation through Hard Evidence in Voting Environments

When it is mandatory for leaders in voting processes to acquire and provide hard evidence, can they still obfuscate voters? How are such leaders affected by majority rules and by external sources of information in the hands of voters? How are voters affected by the leaders' obfuscation strategies? How do obfuscation strategies, and their welfare implications, depend on whether leaders are moderate or radicals? To anwer these questions we investigate a model where leaders must conduct research to obtain evidence and yet such research efforts may be unsuccessful. Leaders can take advantage of this possibility that evidence be not finally obtained to conceal pieces of evidence that would harm them. In turn, voters react skeptically when leaders do not disclose any piece of evidence, which influences the optimal obfuscation strategies by leaders. Leaders want to obfuscate those voters who are closer to them within the spectrum of opinions. Moderate leaders have only weak incentives to conceal evidence and, in some circumstances, they may end up revealing all successfully obtained evidence. In contrast, radical leaders have strong incentives to conceal evidence. Radical leaders prefer that external means of information not be in the hands of voters with opinions similar to the leaders' opinions, whereas moderate leaders do not care much about which voters have external sources of information. When leaders are moderate, voters prefer that external means of information be in the hands of those voters who are closer to the leaders in their opinions.