Evaluación de los resultados de la Licitación del Espectro Radioeléctrico de la COFETEL y su impacto en el sector de servicios de telecomunicación móvil en México

During the auction of the Mexican Radio Spectrum that took place in 2010, the central issues in the public opinion were about the potential fiscal revenue and the possible damage to the State's assets. None of the postures posted by the media considered the impacts of revoking the auction related to: i) welfare losses for the consumers derived from a less competitive environment and mild growth of the telecom sector, ii) the delay entrance of a new competitor and its effects on the market structure and competitiveness of the aforementioned sector, and iii) the Government's credibility for future Radio Spectrum auctions. In this paper we use statistic, econometric and simulation methods that allow us to measure the impact of the entrance of a new competitor to the mobile telecommunications market and likewise create the counterfactual outcome in case the bidding process had been reversed. In this study we find out that delays in the delivery and use of spectrum, as well as possible cancellation on the auction process, would cause a welfare loss due to the absence of new services to the actual and potential consumers of mobile communication. The spectrum availability has a positive impact on the consumers' surplus via price reduction, the latter exceeds up to 8.8 times the possible government's fiscal revenue from the sale of the spectrum. These results are strong evidence that the social gains from spectrum bidding are obtained not from the government's fiscal revenue, but from the gains on the consumer's surpluses.