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Risque relatif et sélection d'équilibre dans un jeu de coordination : une analyse expérimentale

Author

Listed:
  • Dimitri Dubois

    (Université de Montpellier 1 (LAMETA))

  • Marc Willinger

    (Université de Montpellier 1 (LAMETA))

  • Phu Nguyen Van

    (Université de Cergy-Pontoise (Théma))

Abstract

We compare the experimental results of three stag-hunt games. In contrast to Battalio et al.(2001), our design keeps the relative riskiness of the two strategies at a constant level as the optimisation premium is increased. Furthermore, we also test the effect of a decrease of the relative riskiness of the two strategies, when the optimization premium remains constant. Our results show that in the latter case, the frequency of the risk-dominant strategy increases sharply, while in the former case the frequency of the risk-dominant strategy is unaffected. However, we confirm the earlier findings of Battalio et al. that an increase of the optimisation premium, all things equal, favours best response and sensitivity to the payoff-history.

Suggested Citation

  • Dimitri Dubois & Marc Willinger & Phu Nguyen Van, 2006. "Risque relatif et sélection d'équilibre dans un jeu de coordination : une analyse expérimentale," THEMA Working Papers 2006-20, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2006-20
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    File URL: http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2006-20.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    coordination; sélection d’équilibre; expériences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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