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Dynamic Game of Transboundary Pollution Regulation and Strategic Abatement

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  • Victoria Umanskaya
  • Charles Mason
  • Edward Barbier

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  • Victoria Umanskaya & Charles Mason & Edward Barbier, 2007. "Dynamic Game of Transboundary Pollution Regulation and Strategic Abatement," Energy and Environmental Modeling 2007 24000063, EcoMod.
    • Handle: RePEc:ekd:000240:24000063
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    File URL: http://www.ecomod.net/sites/default/files/document-conference/ecomod2007-energy/474.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Caputo,Michael R., 2005. "Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521842723, September.
    2. Markusen, James R. & Morey, Edward R. & Olewiler, Nancy, 1995. "Competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 55-77, January.
    3. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
    4. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249, September.
    5. Ian W.H. Parry & Wallace E. Oates & Ian W.H. Parry & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "Policy Analysis in the Presence of Distorting Taxes," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 4, pages 67-77, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. List, John A. & Mason, Charles F., 2001. "Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 277-296, November.
    7. Fernandez, Linda, 2002. "Trade's Dynamic Solutions to Transboundary Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 386-411, May.
    8. Copeland Brian R., 1994. "International Trade and the Environment: Policy Reform in a Polluted Small Open Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 44-65, January.
    9. Charles Mason & Stephen Polasky, 2002. "Strategic Preemption in a Common Property Resource: A Continuous Time Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(3), pages 255-278, November.
    10. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, January.
    11. Nordström, Håkan & Vaughan, Scott, 1999. "Trade and the environment," WTO Special Studies, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division, volume 4, number 4.
    12. Mason, R, 1997. "Dynamic Pollution Games," Economics Papers 129, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
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    Cited by:

    1. Qi Wang & Qiaoling Liu & Min Shao & Yuanhang Zhang, 2013. "Regional Air Quality Management in China: A Case Study in the Pearl River Delta," Energy & Environment, , vol. 24(7-8), pages 1373-1392, December.

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