The art of deterrence: Singapore’s anti-money laundering regimes

Purpose In light of the recent 1MDB Scandal in Singapore, this research paper aims to examine the deterrent effect of Singapore’s sanctions against money laundering within financial institutions. Design/methodology/approach Case laws and legislations are examined as are relevant reports by regulators. Findings Singapore’s anti-money laundering (AML) regimes may not act as an effective deterrent against money laundering activities within financial institutions. This is due to the overreliance on the theory of deterrence-based thinking, the lack of an “enforcement pyramid” and economic factors which influence regulators to be lenient towards financial institutions. Research limitations/implications There are limited data available in relation to regulators in Singapore and the prevalence of money laundering activities within Singapore’s financial institution. Any discussions within this article is based on the impressionistic observations of this author, which may not reflect the true state of affairs in Singapore. Practical implications Those who are interested in examining the relationship between money laundering and the deterrent effect of sanctions against financial institutions will have an interest in this topic. Originality/value The value of the paper is to demonstrate that Singapore’s AML regimes may not act as an effective deterrence against money laundering activities within financial institutions.