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Property rights to the world’s (linear) ocean fisheries in customary international law

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  • Barrett, Scott

Abstract

I model the ocean as an array of lines set within a two-dimensional frame and show how the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) emerged as an equilibrium in customary international law. I find that custom codifies the efficient Nash equilibrium of enclosure for nearshore fisheries. For highly migratory and offshore fisheries, enclosure is inefficient, and customary law supports a more efficient " free sea” regime. The model also identifies the trigger for changes in property rights and the reason choice of a particular limit, like the current 200-mile zone, is arbitrary. In an asymmetric, regional sea, I find that the scope of the EEZ is determined by the relative power of coastal and distant water states, and need not be efficient. Finally, I find that proposals to nationalize the seas or ban fishing on the high seas are neither efficient nor supportable as equilibria in customary law.

Suggested Citation

  • Barrett, Scott, 2024. "Property rights to the world’s (linear) ocean fisheries in customary international law," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 125568, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:125568
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    closure of high seas; customary international law; exclusive economic zone; ocean fisheries;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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