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What do brokers provide for urban slums?

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  • Shami, Mahvish

Abstract

Rapid urbanisation in developing countries has often resulted in slums with minimal public goods provision, where the poor rely on clientelist networks to provide for their basic needs. Using household-level data, this paper is the first to empirically document how political clientelism operates in Pakistani slums. It finds that urban brokers, unlike their rural counterparts, are unable to claim credit for public goods provision. Instead, they provide personalised and highly targeted services – such as dispute resolution and assistance with documentation. Moreover, unlike traditional clientelism, urban networks are found to be problem-solving and welfare-enhancing for slum dwellers.

Suggested Citation

  • Shami, Mahvish, 2024. "What do brokers provide for urban slums?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 122419, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:122419
    as

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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/122419/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shami, Mahvish, 2019. "Connectivity, Clientelism and Public Provision," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 1227-1250, October.
    2. Scott, James C., 1972. "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 91-113, March.
    3. Shami, Mahvish, 2012. "Collective Action, Clientelism, and Connectivity," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(3), pages 588-606, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    brokers; clientelism; Pakistan; patronage politics; slums; International Growth Centre; Pakistan Office (project reference CPR-PAK-STA-2013-CPP-37107).;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics

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