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Cleansing by tight credit: rational cycles and endogenous lending standards

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  • Farboodi, Maryam
  • Kondor, Peter

Abstract

Endogenous cycles emerge through the two-way interaction between lending standards and production fundamentals. Lax lending standards in booms lead to low interest rates and high output but the deterioration of future loan quality. Low borrower quality in turn precipitates tight standards: the economy enters a recession with high credit spreads and low output but a gradual improvement in the quality of loans. This eventually triggers a shift back to a boom with lax lending, and the cycle continues. The capitalization of expert investors determines the strength of capital reallocation in recessions. Furthermore, although the constrained efficient economy is often cyclical, it features both a static and a dynamic externality in credit supply, hence differing from the decentralized equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Farboodi, Maryam & Kondor, Peter, 2023. "Cleansing by tight credit: rational cycles and endogenous lending standards," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119226, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:119226
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/119226/
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cleansing role of recession; lending standards; endogenous cycles; credit supply; capital reallocation; adverse selection; information choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)

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