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Debt, incentives and performance: evidence from UK panel data

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  • Dessi, Roberta
  • Robertson, Donald

Abstract

A large body of theoretical literature suggests that capital structure plays an important role as a managerial incentive mechanism. Cross-sectional empirical studies have identified a positive effect of leverage on expected performance (measured by Q) for firms with low growth opportunities: this has been interpreted as supporting Jensen's free cash flow hypothesis. However, this evidence does not take into account the endogeneity of capital structure decisions. We investigate how endogeneity affects the results using instrumental variables and allowing for dynamics. The results of earlier studies are then re-interpreted in the light of our findings.

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  • Dessi, Roberta & Robertson, Donald, 2000. "Debt, incentives and performance: evidence from UK panel data," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119107, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:119107
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    Cited by:

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    2. Calcagno, R. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2004. "Capital Structure and Managerial Compensation : The Effects of Renumeration Seniority," Discussion Paper 2004-120, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Nur Ainna Ramli & Gilbert Nartea, 2016. "Mediation Effects of Firm Leverage in Malaysia: Partial Least Squares - Structural Equation Modeling," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 6(1), pages 301-307.
    4. Ratnam Vijayakumaran & Sunitha Vijayakumaran, 2019. "Leverage, Debt Maturity and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 9(4), pages 491-506, May.
    5. Chen, Yenn-Ru & Lee, Bong Soo, 2010. "A dynamic analysis of executive stock options: Determinants and consequences," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 88-103, February.
    6. Douglas J. Cumming & J. Ari Pandes & Michael J. Robinson, 2015. "The Role of Agents in Private Entrepreneurial Finance," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 39(2), pages 345-374, March.
    7. Alan Schwartz, "undated". "A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1037, American Law & Economics Association.
    8. Aggarwal, Raj & Zhao, Xinlei, 2007. "The leverage-value relationship puzzle: An industry effects resolution," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 286-297.
    9. Yenn‐Ru Chen, 2008. "Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings: Listed New Economy versus Old Economy Firms," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 430-442, September.
    10. Zaheda Daruwala, 2023. "Influence of Financial Leverage on Corporate Profitability: Does it Really Matter?," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 13(4), pages 37-46, July.
    11. Badi H. Baltagi, 2021. "Dynamic Panel Data Models," Springer Texts in Business and Economics, in: Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, edition 6, chapter 0, pages 187-228, Springer.
    12. Abubakr Saeed & Yacine Belghitar & Ephraim Clark, 2017. "Political connections and firm operational efficiencies: evidence from a developing country," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 191-224, January.
    13. Vu Hiep Hoang & Manh Dung Tran & Van Hoa Hoang & Thi Thu Cuc Nguyen, 2019. "Capital Structure and Financial Efficiency: Evidence from Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange of Vietnam," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 9(11), pages 1255-1265, November.
    14. Ramli, Nur Ainna & Latan, Hengky & Solovida, Grace T., 2019. "Determinants of capital structure and firm financial performance—A PLS-SEM approach: Evidence from Malaysia and Indonesia," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 148-160.
    15. Nguyen Vinh Khuong & Dinh Thi Thu Thao, 2016. "The impact of capital structure choice on firm’s financial performance: An empirical analysis of delisted firms in Viet Nam," HO CHI MINH CITY OPEN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF SCIENCE - ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, HO CHI MINH CITY OPEN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF SCIENCE, HO CHI MINH CITY OPEN UNIVERSITY, vol. 6(2), pages 42-54.
    16. Pierre Durand, 2018. "Impact du financement par fonds de pension sur la performance des entreprises du CAC 40 ?," Working Papers hal-04141801, HAL.
    17. Ropero Moriones, Eva, 2005. "Limited liability in business groups," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb057617, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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