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Bankers' pay and the evolving structure of US banking

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  • Anderson, Ronald W.
  • Jõeveer, Karin

Abstract

We study the evolution of pay in US bank holding companies since 1986. We first set out the main empirical characteristics in both cross-section and time series focussing on banking structure (size and concentration) and pay characteristics given by labor's share of bank value-added, the level of an average bankers' real compensation and the sensitivity of that compensation to firm performance. Then we introduce a structural model in which bankers of heterogenous talent are matched with banks where shareholders design compensation contracts so as to maximise shareholder payoff in the face of managerial moral hazard. We calibrate this model to see if it provides an internally consistent account of the observed empirical patterns. By incorporating structural changes coinciding with three major changes in banking regulation we are able to reproduce changes in pay level and pay sensitivity observed and to establish a secular decline in labor's share consistent with a superstar firm effect in US banking. Overall we find that the observed pay fits closely to fair pay as predicted by our equilibrium model.

Suggested Citation

  • Anderson, Ronald W. & Jõeveer, Karin, 2022. "Bankers' pay and the evolving structure of US banking," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118862, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:118862
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/118862/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking industry structure; rent extraction; superstar firms; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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