Crisis, clientelism and institutional resilience: reflections on a public sector reform under the MoUs

Structural reforms, particularly in the area of public administration, have always proved a challenge for Greek governments. During the 2010s crisis, the magnitude of the policy and institutional failures of the previous politico-administrative establishment and pressure from the creditors, led to an ambitious public administration reform programme. While many reforms were successfully implemented during this time, the overall implementation record remained erratic with many delays, gaps and even reversals in key reforms. Seeking to provide an explanation for the observed implementation record, this paper examines alternative propositions for the resilience of public administration institutions under conditions of deep crisis and external conditionality. Empirically, the paper focuses on one of the flagship public administration reforms in the conditionality programme, the reform of the remuneration system for public sector employees. It is shown that the implementation record for this reform can be best explained by recourse to the dynamics of the clientelist equilibrium at the core of the politico-administrative nexus in Greece.