The interactions between state budget and political budget in Syria

This memo aims to understand how the Syrian regime has used the state budget as a tool to reallocate resources for the benefit of warlords and crony capitalists. This mechanism plays multiple roles in Syria’s contemporary political economy: on one hand, it is one of the means by which elites are given access to political funds in exchange for their loyalty (and other political services). At the same time, it represents one of the different ways in which the regime can replenish its political budget, which refers to the funds available for the ruler for discretionary spending on its elites to ensure their loyalty (de Waal, 2016). The memo analyzes the interactions between state budget and political budget from the perspective of an authoritarian bargain during the conflict in Syria. This approach assumes that repression is not sufficient for authoritarian regimes, including the Syrian one, to sustain control over their countries (Desai et al., 2009). Thus, in parallel to using coercive measures, they need to bargain with people and elites. Finally, the memo also investigates the modalities through which the elites have increasingly benefitted from public spending.