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Reciprocal Brokered Deposits, Bank Risk, and Recent Deposit Insurance Policy

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  • Guo Li
  • Sherrill Shaffer

Abstract

This study provides new evidence regarding reciprocal brokered deposits (RBDs), regulatory responses, and bank risk, contributing to prior studies in four ways. First, using updated financial Call Report data and bank failure data through 2012, we reexamine the moral hazard hypothesis that banks using RBDs exhibit higher risk. Second, we uncover a previously overlooked positive association between RBDs and banks’ cost of failure. Third, we apply Granger causality tests; and finally, we test whether the FDIC’s recent revision of its pricing discourages the use of RBDs and weakens its association with bank risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Guo Li & Sherrill Shaffer, 2014. "Reciprocal Brokered Deposits, Bank Risk, and Recent Deposit Insurance Policy," CAMA Working Papers 2014-56, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    • Handle: RePEc:een:camaaa:2014-56
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    File URL: https://cama.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/cama_crawford_anu_edu_au/2014-07/56_2014_li_shaffer.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Olesya V. Kononenko & Marina V. Chudinovskikh, 2018. "Comparative Analysis of the Depositor Rights’ Protection Systems in the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus," Journal of New Economy, Ural State University of Economics, vol. 19(5), pages 32-43, October.
    2. James R. Barth & Wenling Lu & Yanfei Sun, 2020. "Regulatory Restrictions on US Bank Funding Sources: A Review of the Treatment of Brokered Deposits," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-27, June.
    3. Kaelo Mpho Ntwaepelo, 2023. "Bank Stability versus Financial Development: A Generous Deposit Insurer's Dilemma," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2023-09, Department of Economics, University of Reading.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reciprocal Brokered Deposits; Moral Hazard; cost of failure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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