IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/edn/sirdps/322.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Universal banking, competition and risk in a macro model

Author

Listed:
  • Damjanovic, Tatiana
  • Damjanovic, Vladislav
  • Nolan, Charles

Abstract

A stylized macroeconomic model is developed with an indebted, heterogeneous Investment Banking Sector funded by borrowing from a retail banking sector. The government guarantees retail deposits. Investment banks choose how risky their activities should be. We compared the benefits of separated vs. universal banking modelled as a vertical integration of the retail and investment banks. The incidence of banking default is considered under different constellations of shocks and degrees of competitiveness. The benefits of universal banking rise in the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks to trading strategies and are positive even for very bad common shocks, even though government bailouts, which are costly, are larger compared to the case of separated banking entities. The welfare assessment of the structure of banks may depend crucially on the kinds of shock hitting the economy as well as on the efficiency of government intervention.

Suggested Citation

  • Damjanovic, Tatiana & Damjanovic, Vladislav & Nolan, Charles, 2012. "Universal banking, competition and risk in a macro model," SIRE Discussion Papers 2012-19, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    • Handle: RePEc:edn:sirdps:322
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10943/322
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Repullo, Rafael, 2004. "Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 156-182, April.
    2. Greenwood, Jeremy & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1990. "Financial Development, Growth, and the Distribution of Income," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 1076-1107, October.
    3. Wilko Bolt & Alexander F. Tieman, 2004. "Banking Competition, Risk and Regulation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(4), pages 783-804, December.
    4. Gary B. Gorton, 2010. "Questions and Answers about the Financial Crisis," NBER Working Papers 15787, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. John H. Boyd & Chun Chang & Bruce Smith, 1998. "Moral hazard under commercial and universal banking," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Aug, pages 426-471.
    6. Yunus Aksoy & Henrique S. Basso & Javier Coto-Martinez, 2013. "Lending Relationships And Monetary Policy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 368-393, January.
    7. Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 2004. "Competition and Financial Stability," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 453-480, June.
    8. Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, 2005. "Financial Dependence, Banking Sector Competition, and Economic Growth," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 179-207, March.
    9. Kenneth R. French & Martin N. Baily & John Y. Campbell & John H. Cochrane & Douglas W. Diamond & Darrell Duffie & Anil K Kashyap & Frederic S. Mishkin & Raghuram G. Rajan & David S. Scharfstein & Robe, 2010. "The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9261.
    10. John H. Boyd & Gianni De Nicoló, 2005. "The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1329-1343, June.
    11. Sam Allgood & Arthur Snow, 1998. "The Marginal Cost of Raising Tax Revenue and Redistributing Income," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1246-1273, December.
    12. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1997. "Banking Scope and Financial Innovation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(4), pages 1099-1131.
    13. Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jeremy Greenwood & Juan M. Sanchez & Cheng Wang, 2010. "Financing Development: The Role of Information Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1875-1891, September.
    2. HAKIMI Abdelaziz & Ahmet DKHILI Hichem & KHLAIFIA Wafa, 2012. "Universal Banking and Credit Risk: Evidence from Tunisia," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 2(4), pages 496-504.
    3. Banerji, Sanjay & Basu, Parantap, 2015. "Borrower's moral hazard, risk premium, and welfare: A comparison of universal and stand-alone banking systems," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 61-72.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Damjanovic, Tatiana & Damjanovic, Vladislav & Nolan, Charles, 2012. "Universal banking, competition and risk in a macro model," SIRE Discussion Papers 2012-19, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    2. Tatiana Damjanovic & Vladislav Damjanovic & Charles Nolan, 2013. "Universal vs separated banking with deposit insurance in a macro model," Discussion Papers 1308, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    3. Agoraki, Maria-Eleni K. & Delis, Manthos D. & Pasiouras, Fotios, 2011. "Regulations, competition and bank risk-taking in transition countries," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 38-48, January.
    4. Yener Altunbas & Michiel van Leuvensteijn & David Marques-Ibanez, 2013. "Competition And Bank Risk: The Role Of Securitization And Bank Capital," Working Papers 13005, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
    5. Tatiana Damjanovic & Vladislav Damjanovic & Charles Nolan, 2020. "Default, Bailouts and the Vertical Structure of Financial Intermediaries," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 38, pages 154-180, October.
    6. Noman, Abu Hanifa Md. & Gee, Chan Sok & Isa, Che Ruhana, 2018. "Does bank regulation matter on the relationship between competition and financial stability? Evidence from Southeast Asian countries," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 144-161.
    7. El Moussawi, Chawki & Mansour, Rana, 2022. "Competition, cost efficiency and stability of banks in the MENA region," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 143-170.
    8. John H. Boyd & Mr. Gianni De Nicolo & Abu M. Jalal, 2009. "Bank Competition, Risk, and Asset Allocations," IMF Working Papers 2009/143, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Pozo, Jorge & Rojas, Youel, 2023. "Bank competition and credit risk: The case of Peru," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    10. Altunbas, Yener & Marques-Ibanez, David & van Leuvensteijn, Michiel & Zhao, Tianshu, 2022. "Market power and bank systemic risk: Role of securitization and bank capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    11. González, Luis Otero & Razia, Alaa & Búa, Milagros Vivel & Sestayo, Rubén Lado, 2017. "Competition, concentration and risk taking in Banking sector of MENA countries," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 591-604.
    12. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2011. "Bank size and risk-taking under Basel II," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1436-1449, June.
    13. Wu, Ji & Guo, Mengmeng & Chen, Minghua & Jeon, Bang Nam, 2019. "Market power and risk-taking of banks: Some semiparametric evidence from emerging economies," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    14. Gazi I. Kara, 2016. "Bank Capital Regulations Around the World : What Explains the Differences?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-057, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    15. Beck, Thorsten & De Jonghe, Olivier & Schepens, Glenn, 2013. "Bank competition and stability: Cross-country heterogeneity," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 218-244.
    16. Nina Vujanović & Nikola Fabris, 2021. "Does market competition affect all banks equally? Empirical evidence on Montenegro," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 10(2), pages 87-107.
    17. Guo, Wen-Chung & Tseng, Ping-Lun, 2023. "COVID-19, bank risk, and capital regulation: The aggregate shock and social distancing," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 155-173.
    18. Arping, Stefan, 2017. "Deposit competition and loan markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 108-118.
    19. Eva Schliephake & Roland Kirstein, 2013. "Strategic Effects of Regulatory Capital Requirements in Imperfect Banking Competition," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(4), pages 675-700, June.
    20. Xavier Vives, 2011. "Competition and Stability in Banking," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia (ed.),Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence, edition 1, volume 16, chapter 12, pages 455-502, Central Bank of Chile.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Risk in DSGE models; investment banking; financial intermediation; separating commercial and investment banking; competition and risk; moral hazard in banking; prudential regulation; systematic vs. idiosyncratic risks.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E13 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Neoclassical
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:edn:sirdps:322. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Research Office (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sireeuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.