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Economic Performance, Wealth Distribution and Credit Restrictions with Continuous Investment

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  • Ronald Fischer
  • Diego Huerta

Abstract

We study a simple model where entrepreneurs require capital for investment. They have heterogenous wealth and face lending constraints. Agents with little wealth cannot fund their projects, those with intermediate wealth can fund inefficiently sized projects. Only wealthy entrepreneurs attain the efficient firm size. We examine the effects of redistribution. These depend on the aggregate wealth of the economy; in low wealth countries, redistribution reduces credit penetration, efficiency and GDP, while the results are reversed in a wealthy economy. This effect depends on the quality of financial institutions: better institutions reduce the country wealth necessary for redistribution to have positive effects. We add labor as a factor to study the political economy effects of worker protection in bankruptcy and of improvements in credit market legislation. JEL: G30, O15, O16. Key words: Keywords: Wealth distribution, firm size, credit market imperfections, bankruptcy

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald Fischer & Diego Huerta, 2016. "Economic Performance, Wealth Distribution and Credit Restrictions with Continuous Investment," Documentos de Trabajo 326, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    • Handle: RePEc:edj:ceauch:326
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    keywords: wealth distribution; firm size; credit market imperfections; bankruptcy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

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