Good Housekeeping? Reputation, Fixed Exchange Rates, and the 'Original Sin' Problem
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- Prasanna Gai & Kang-yong Tan, 2004. "Good Housekeeping? Reputation, Fixed Exchange Rates, and the 'Original Sin' Problem," Working Papers 082004, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
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More about this item
Keywords
International Monetary Arrangement; Foreign Currency Debt; Reputation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-IFN-2004-10-30 (International Finance)
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