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Political Competition, Welfare Outcomes and Expenditures on Human Development: The Experience of a Democracy

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  • Richard Damania
  • Arnab Gupta

Abstract

There is a growing literature on the effect of electoral competition and democratic participation on issues such as corruption and government policy. The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that electoral competition has a beneficial impact on policies. This paper studies the effects of political competition and democratic participation on welfare outcomes. We develop a model to assess the effects of electoral competition on human developmental outcomes and empirically test the key predictions using data on infant mortality rates (IMR) in India. The empirical results provide strong support for the theoretical conjectures, which suggest that high electoral competition and high citizen participation in elections can explain much of the variation in IMR across different states in a democratic country like India.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Damania & Arnab Gupta, 2004. "Political Competition, Welfare Outcomes and Expenditures on Human Development: The Experience of a Democracy," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 147, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:ausm04:147
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    Cited by:

    1. Dash, Bharatee Bhushan & Mukherjee, Sacchidananda, 2013. "Does Political Competition Influence Human Development? Evidence from the Indian States," Working Papers 13/118, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    human development; electoral competition;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

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