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Present Bias in Politics and Self-Committing Treaties

Author

Listed:
  • Harstad, Bard

    (Stanford U)

  • Kessler, Anke

    (Simon Fraser U)

Abstract

We study how international agreements can take advantage of domestic time-inconsistency problems in the context of environmental policies. For example, policymakers will prefer future policies to be sustainable, but find it tempting to raise consumption when being in office. We find the equilibrium number of signatory countries to be higher than when preferences are time consistent, especially when the political environment is unstable and polarized, and the international spillovers are limited. In contrast to the traditional literature, the model can also explain why countries sign conventions with mandates that do not vary with the coalition size.

Suggested Citation

  • Harstad, Bard & Kessler, Anke, 2024. "Present Bias in Politics and Self-Committing Treaties," Research Papers 4210, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:4210
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    File URL: https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/present-bias-politics-self-committing-treaties
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    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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