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The Incentives to (Not) Debate in Low-Information Races

Author

Listed:
  • Casey, Katherine

    (Stanford U)

  • Glennerster, Rachel

    (U of Chicago)

Abstract

Why are there few debates in low-information elections where they have the greatest potential to inform vote choices? Consistent with weak incentives to reveal their quality or make policy commitments, we find only a quarter of Parliamentary candidates in Sierra Leone privately volunteer to debate. Publicizing their choices through guaranteed dissemination platforms allows voters to punish those who abstain and sharply increases participation. Randomly improving platform quality induces frontrunners to join. We document high voter willingness to pay to access debates and private sector interest in disseminating them, confirming that candidate reluctance and not market viability is the main barrier.

Suggested Citation

  • Casey, Katherine & Glennerster, Rachel, 2024. "The Incentives to (Not) Debate in Low-Information Races," Research Papers 4178, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:4178
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    File URL: https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/working-papers/incentives-not-debate-low-information-races
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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