The World's Poorest Countries: Debt Relief or Aid?
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Cited by:
- Guinnane, Timothy W., 2004.
"Financial Vergangenheitsbewaltigung: The 1953 London Debt Agreement,"
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28387, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
- Timothy W. Guinnane, 2004. "Financial Vergangenheitsbewältigung: The 1953 London Debt Agreement," Working Papers 880, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
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