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Rollover risk, liquidity, and macro-prudential regulation

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  • Ahnert, Toni

Abstract

I study rollover risk in the wholesale funding market when intermediaries can hold liquidity ex-ante and are subject to fire sales ex-post. I demonstrate that precautionary liquidity restores multiple equilibria in a global rollover game. An intermediate liquidity level supports both the usual run equilibrium and an efficient equilibrium. I provide a uniqueness refinement to characterize the privately optimal liquidity choice. Because of fire sales, liquidity holdings are strategic substitutes. Intermediaries free-ride on the liquidity of other intermediaries, causing excessive liquidation. A macro-prudential authority internalizes the systemic nature of liquidity and restores constrained efficiency by imposing a macro-prudential liquidity buffer. JEL Classification: G01, G11, G28

Suggested Citation

  • Ahnert, Toni, 2014. "Rollover risk, liquidity, and macro-prudential regulation," Working Paper Series 1667, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20141667
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    Cited by:

    1. Christos Argyropoulos & Bertrand Candelon & Jean‐Baptiste Hasse & Ekaterini Panopoulou, 2024. "Towards a macroprudential regulatory framework for mutual funds?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(3), pages 3063-3082, July.
    2. Gerardo Ferrara & Sam Langfield & Zijun Liu & Tomohiro Ota, 2019. "Systemic illiquidity in the interbank network," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(11), pages 1779-1795, November.
    3. Ahnert, Toni & Georg, Co-Pierre, 2018. "Information contagion and systemic risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 159-171.
    4. Toni Ahnert & Ali Kakhbod, 2017. "Information Choice and Amplification of Financial Crises," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(6), pages 2130-2178.
    5. Daron Acemoglu & Asuman Ozdaglar & James Siderius & Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, 2020. "Systemic Credit Freezes in Financial Lending Networks," NBER Working Papers 27149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Toni Ahnert & Benjamin Nelson, 2016. "Opaque Assets and Rollover Risk," Staff Working Papers 16-17, Bank of Canada.
    7. Aldasoro, Iñaki & Faia, Ester, 2016. "Systemic loops and liquidity regulation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 1-16.
    8. Jean-Baptiste Hasse & Christelle Lecourt & Souhila Siagh, 2023. "Institutional Stock-Bond Portfolios Rebalancing and Financial Stability," AMSE Working Papers 2322, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    9. Xuewen Liu, 2018. "Diversification and Systemic Bank Runs," 2018 Meeting Papers 739, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Yang, Hsin-Feng & Liu, Chih-Liang & Yeutien Chou, Ray, 2020. "Bank diversification and systemic risk," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 311-326.
    11. Ikeda, Daisuke, 2024. "Bank runs, prudential tools and social welfare in a global game general equilibrium model," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    12. Sebastian Infante & Alexandros Vardoulakis, 2018. "Collateral Runs," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2018-022, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    13. Eisenbach, Thomas M., 2017. "Rollover risk as market discipline: A two-sided inefficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(2), pages 252-269.
    14. Adi Mordel, 2018. "Prudential Liquidity Regulation in Banking-A Literature Review," Discussion Papers 18-8, Bank of Canada.
    15. Xuewen Liu, 2023. "A Model of Systemic Bank Runs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 731-793, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    global games; multiplicity; portfolio choice; wholesale funding;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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