Do countries falsify economic date strategically? Some evidence that they do
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- Gilles Stoltz & Tomasz Michalski, 2010. "Do countries falsify economic date strategically? Some evidence that they do," Working Papers hal-00579319, HAL.
- Tomasz Michalski & Gilles Stoltz, 2010. "Do Countries falsify Economic Data Strategically? Some Evidence That They Do," DEGIT Conference Papers c015_018, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Tomasz Michalski & Gilles Stoltz, 2013. "Do Countries Falsify Economic Data Strategically? Some Evidence that They Do," Working Papers hal-01903804, HAL.
- Tomasz Kamil Michalski & Guillaume Stoltz, 2010. "Do countries falsify economic data strategically? Some evidence that they do," Post-Print hal-00543492, HAL.
- Tomasz Kamil Michalski & Guillaume Stoltz, 2010. "Do countries falsify economic data strategically? Some evidence that they do," Post-Print hal-00543490, HAL.
- Tomasz Kamil Michalski & Guillaume Stoltz, 2010. "Do countries falsify economic date strategically? Some evidence that they do," Working Papers hal-00540794, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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"Do countries falsify economic date strategically? Some evidence that they do,"
Working Papers
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- Tomasz Michalski & Gilles Stoltz, 2010. "Do Countries falsify Economic Data Strategically? Some Evidence That They Do," DEGIT Conference Papers c015_018, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
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More about this item
Keywords
capital flows; public information provision; misinformation; Benford's law; transparency;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
- F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
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