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Consumer Coordination and Optimal Pricing under Network Externalities

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  • Seiya Hirano

Abstract

In the adoption decisions of network goods, coordination problems lead to multiple equilibria. While consumers coordination significantly impacts the firm's pricing strategies, the precise relationship between coordination behavior and optimal pricing has received little attention. This paper analyzes optimal pricing strategies for network goods under different forms of consumer coordination in a two-period model with strategic consumers. We introduce two novel coordination criteria: risk dominance and threshold coordination. Risk dominance coordination accounts for the risk premium of no-adoption and threshold coordination accounts for consumer heterogeneity in the adoption of the good. We show that under the risk dominance criterion, the firm sets a lower price in period 1 when the risk of the coordination failure is high, but sets a higher price in period 1 when the risk is low. Under threshold coordination, the firm sets a lower price in period 1 when consumers hold pessimistic beliefs about the network size and sets a higher price in period 1 when beliefs are optimistic. Our findings highlight the critical implications of consumer coordination for firms' pricing strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Seiya Hirano, 2024. "Consumer Coordination and Optimal Pricing under Network Externalities," ISER Discussion Paper 1267r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, revised Jan 2025.
  • Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1267r
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