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Traditional Elites: Political Economy of Agricultural Technology and Tenancy

Author

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  • Sabrin Beg

    (Department of Economics, University of Delaware)

Abstract

Traditional elites can perpetuate their political influence through agricultural relationships. I show that landlords in Pakistan can make cost-effective transfers to sharecropper-tenants, thereby gaining tenants' electoral support and controlling policy. Technological change in agriculture makes sharecropping less optimal, attenuating landlords' electoral advantage. Exogenous productivity change lowers the rate of sharecropping and lowers the likelihood of election of landlords in landlord-dominated areas; in turn electoral competition improves and the composition of public goods shifts. While demonstrating clientelism in rural agrarian societies through sharecropping contracts, I also highlight how changes in agricultural technology affect it.

Suggested Citation

  • Sabrin Beg, 2017. "Traditional Elites: Political Economy of Agricultural Technology and Tenancy," Working Papers 17-03, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:dlw:wpaper:17-03
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    File URL: http://www.lerner.udel.edu/sites/default/files/ECON/PDFs/RePEc/dlw/WorkingPapers/2017/UDWP2017-03.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Land Inequality; Clientelism; Public Goods; Colonial Institutions; Electoral Competition; Traditional Chiefs; Political Economy; Elite Capture; Agricultural Productivity.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products

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