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The Heterogeneous Effects of Social Assistance and Unemployment Insurance: Evidence from a Life-Cycle Model of Family Labor Supply and Savings

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  • Peter Haan
  • Victoria Prowse

Abstract

We empirically analyze the heterogeneous welfare effects of unemployment insurance and social assistance. We estimate a structural life-cycle model of singles' and married couples' labor supply and savings decisions. The model includes heterogeneity by age, education, wealth, sex and household composition. In aggregate, social assistance dominates unemployment insurance; however, the opposite holds true for married men, whose leisure time declines more than that of their spouses when unemployment insurance is reduced. A revenue-neutral rebalancing of social support away from unemployment insurance and toward social assistance increases aggregate welfare. Income pooling in married households decreases the welfare value of social assistance.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Haan & Victoria Prowse, 2023. "The Heterogeneous Effects of Social Assistance and Unemployment Insurance: Evidence from a Life-Cycle Model of Family Labor Supply and Savings," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 2040, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp2040
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Konstantinos Tatsiramos & Jan C. Ours, 2014. "Labor Market Effects Of Unemployment Insurance Design," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 284-311, April.
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    7. Luigi Pistaferri, 2001. "Superior Information, Income Shocks, And The Permanent Income Hypothesis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 465-476, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Life-cycle labor supply; family labor supply; unemployment insurance; social assistance; household savings; employment risk; added worker effect; intra-household insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy
    • J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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