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On the Role of Numbers and Information in Competition

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[fre] II est souvent insisté, dans les interprétations données aux résultats de Arrow et Debreu établissant l'existence de l'équilibre concurrentiel, sur l'importance en cette matière de la taille du marché et du nombre de participants. Cependant on constate que, d'un point de vue strictement mathématique, ces résultats sont totalement indépendants de ces derniers paramètres. Il n'en est pas de même des théorèmes établissant la convergence du noyau (core) vers l'ensemble des équilibres concurrentiels lorsque croît la taille de l'économie ; cependant le noyau est un concept insatisfaisant car non stratégique et trop exigeant en matière d'information. Aussi des modèles dynamiques à faible niveau d'information (dont le modèle de Cournot peut apparaître comme l'ancêtre) et qui prennent en compte à la fois biens et services et instruments financiers, semblent bien préférables pour la compréhension de la formation des prix, préférables à tous les modèles dont l'axe est soit l'équilibre concurrentiel, soit le noyau.
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  • Martin Shubik, 1974. "On the Role of Numbers and Information in Competition," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 371, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:371
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    1. Scarf, Herbert E., 1971. "On the existence of a coopertive solution for a general class of N-person games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 169-181, June.
    2. Lloyd Shapley & Martin Shubik, 1969. "Price Strategy Oligopoly With Product Variation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 30-44, February.
    3. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "Pure Competition, Coalitional Power, and Fair Division," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 10(3), pages 337-362, October.
    4. Gerard Debreu, 1963. "On a Theorem of Scarf," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 30(3), pages 177-180.
    5. Nelson, Richard R & Winter, Sidney G, 1974. "Neoclassical vs. Evolutionary Theories of Economic Growth: Critique and Prospectus," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 84(336), pages 886-905, December.
    6. Martin Shubik & Ward Whitt, 1973. "Fiat Money in an Economy with One Nondurable Good and No Credit (A Noncooperative Sequential Game)," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 355, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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