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Renegotiation without Holdup: Anticipating Spending and Infrastructure Concessions

Author

Listed:
  • Eduardo Engel

    (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)

  • Ronald Fischer

    (University of Chile - Center of Applied Economics (CEA))

  • Alexander Galetovic

    (Universidad de los Andes)

Abstract

Infrastructure concessions are frequently renegotiated after investments are sunk, resulting in better contractual terms for the franchise holders. This paper offers a political economy explanation for renegotiations that occur with no apparent holdup. We argue that they are used by political incumbents to anticipate infrastructure spending and thereby increase the probability of winning the upcoming election. Contract renegotiations allow administrations to replicate the effects of issuing debt. Yet debt issues are incorporated in the budget, must be approved by Congress and are therefore subject to the opposition's review. By contrast, under current accounting standards the obligations created by renegotiations circumvent the budgetary process in most countries. Hence, renegotiations allow incumbents to spend more without being subject to Congressional oversight.

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2006. "Renegotiation without Holdup: Anticipating Spending and Infrastructure Concessions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1567, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1567
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Guasch, J. Luis & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Straub, Stephane, 2003. "Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3011, The World Bank.
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    5. J. Luis Guasch, 2004. "Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions : Doing it Right," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15024.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. de Brux, Julie, 2010. "The Dark and Bright Sides of Renegotiation: An Application to Transport Concession Contracts," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 77-85, June.
    2. Dimas de Castro e Silva Neto & Carlos Oliveira Cruz & Joaquim Miranda Sarmento, 2017. "Understanding the patterns of PPP renegotiations for infrastructure projects in Latin America," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 18(3-4), pages 271-296, September.
    3. Athias, Laure & Saussier, Stéphane, 2007. "Contractual flexibility or rigidity for public private partnerships? Theory and evidence from infrastructure concession contracts," MPRA Paper 10541, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & ELISABETTA IOSSA & DAVID MARTIMORT, 2015. "The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 4-48, February.
    5. Stéphane Saussier & Carine Staropoli & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2009. "Public–Private Agreements, Institutions, and Competition: When Economic Theory Meets Facts," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 35(1), pages 1-18, September.
    6. Moszoro, Marian W. & Spiller, Pablo T., 2014. "Third-Party Opportunism and the Theory of Public Contracts: Operationalization and Applications," MPRA Paper 101592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Alexander Moore & Stéphane Straub & Jean-Jacques Dethier, 2014. "Regulation, renegotiation and capital structure: theory and evidence from Latin American transport concessions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 209-232, April.
    8. repec:jle:journl:131 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Chiara D'Alpaos & Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi, 2008. "Optimal penalty for investment delay in public procurement contracts," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0074, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    10. Elisabetta Iossa & David Martimort, 2011. "The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector," Chapters, in: André de Palma & Robin Lindsey & Emile Quinet & Roger Vickerman (ed.), A Handbook of Transport Economics, chapter 29, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Fay, Marianne & Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2021. "Funding and financing infrastructure: The joint-use of public and private finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    12. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2020. "Political corruption in the execution of public contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 116-140.
    13. Antonio Estache & Stéphane Saussier, 2014. "Public-Private Partnerships and Efficiency: A Short Assessment," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(3), pages 08-13, October.
    14. Andrey Berezin & Bruno S. Sergi & Natalia Gorodnova, 2018. "Efficiency Assessment of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects: The Case of Russia," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(10), pages 1-18, October.
    15. D'Alpaos, Chiara & Moretto, Michele & Valbonesi, Paola & Vergalli, Sergio, 2009. ""It Is Never too late": Optimal Penalty for Investment Delay in Public Procurement Contracts," Institutions and Markets Papers 54351, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    16. Jean Shaoul & Anne Stafford & Pam Stapleton, 2010. "Financial black holes," Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 23(2), pages 229-255, February.
    17. repec:ces:ifodic:v:12:y:2014:i:3:p:19126463 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Ricardo Ferreira Reis & Joaquim Miranda Sarmento, 2019. "“Cutting costs to the bone”: the Portuguese experience in renegotiating public private partnerships highways during the financial crisis," Transportation, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 285-302, February.
    19. World Bank, 2009. "Good Governance in Public-Private Partnerships : A Resource Guide for Practitioners," World Bank Publications - Reports 12665, The World Bank Group.
    20. Guasch, J. Luis & Straub, Stphane, 2009. "Corruption and concession renegotiations.: Evidence from the water and transport sectors in Latin America," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 185-190, June.
    21. Javier Alonso & Jasmina Bjeletic & Carlos Herrera & Soledad Hormazabal & Ivonne Ordonez & Carolina Romero & David Tuesta, 2010. "A Balance of Pension Fund Infrastructure Investments: The Experience in Latin America," Working Papers 1003, BBVA Bank, Economic Research Department.
    22. repec:bla:annpce:v:89:y:2018:i:1:p:25-48 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Antonio Estache & Stéphane Saussier, 2014. "Public-Private Partnerships and Efficiency: A Short Assessment," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(03), pages 08-13, October.
    24. Athias, Laure & Nunez, Antonio, 2008. "The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions," MPRA Paper 10539, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Build-operate-and-transfer (BOT); Concessions; Renegotiation; Public-private partnerships;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General

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