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Necessary conditions on the existence of pure Nash equilibrium in concave games and Cournot oligopoly games

Author

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  • Forgó, Ferenc

Abstract

Necessary conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria introduced by Joó (A note on minimax theorems, Annales Univ. Sci. Budapest, 39(1996) 175-179) for concave non-cooperative games are generalized and then applied to Cournot oligopoly games. If for a specified class of games there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium, then cost functions of the firms must be convex. Analogously, if for another specified class of games there always exists a pure Nash equilibrium, then revenue functions of the firms must be concave in their respective variables.

Suggested Citation

  • Forgó, Ferenc, 2019. "Necessary conditions on the existence of pure Nash equilibrium in concave games and Cournot oligopoly games," Corvinus Economics Working Papers (CEWP) 2019/08, Corvinus University of Budapest.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2019/08
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    File URL: https://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/4287/
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    Keywords

    Nash equilibrium; Cournot oligopoly;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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