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Strategic Interactions and Atoms' Power in Public Goods Economies

Author

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  • Hovav PERETS

    (Israel Institute of Technology, Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management)

  • Benyamin SHITOVITZ

    (University of Haifa, Department of Economics)

Abstract

In this paper, we study Nash equilibrium in a smooth public goods economy, described as a noncooperative game, where the set of players is a mixed-measure space of consumers. We assume a finite number of private goods. We show that under certain conditions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the economy, where the public goods are produced with a linear technology. Moreover, we discuss the difference in market power between an atomless sector and an atom with the same utility function and an atom with its split atomless sector in both a pure exchange economy and a public goods economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Hovav PERETS & Benyamin SHITOVITZ, 2013. "Strategic Interactions and Atoms' Power in Public Goods Economies," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2013042, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2013042
    Note: Special Issue : Recent Developments in Strategic Interactions and General Equilibrium
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Goods; Private provision of public goods; Nash equilibrium; Mixed measure space of consumers; Linear technology;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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