Un modèle de mobilité résidentielle avec taxe foncière

Individuals with heterogeneous incomes occupy a territory divided into zones with unequal levels of amenities. Using the concept of land rent à la Ricardo, we propose a model determining the land rent in the different zones as well as the distribution of individuals across them. A land tax modifies the equilibrium of the land market without tax if its amount exceeds the rent in some zones. In this case, individuals are led to concentrate on a reduced part of the territory, which affects negatively their utility. If the tax incomes are used to finance a global public good, the direct negative impact of the tax can be reduced and possibly more than compensated. An externality that affects negatively the amenities in one zone impacts the rents in all zones via a process of "voting with the feet". In the presence of a land tax, the externality may lead to a reduction in the populated part of the territory. However, the tax incomes may finance a compensation system where the landowners victims of the externality are compensated by those who are not affected.