IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ctl/louvir/1999016.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Asymmetries of information in centralized order-driven markets

Author

Listed:
  • Boccard, N.

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Department of Economics; Université de Liège)

  • Calcagno, R.

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES); UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))

Abstract

We study the efficiency of the equilibrium price in a centralized, order-driven market where many asymmetrically informed traders are active for many periods. We show that asymmetries of information can lead to sub-optimal information revelation with respect to the symmetric case. In particular, we assess that the more precise the information the higher the incentive to reveal it, and that the value of private information is related to the volume of exogenous trade present on the market. Moreover, we prove that any informed trader, whatever his information, reveals his private signal during an active phase of the market, concluding that long pre-opening phases are not effective as an information discovering device in the presence of strategic players.

Suggested Citation

  • Boccard, N. & Calcagno, R., 1999. "Asymmetries of information in centralized order-driven markets," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1999016, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1999016
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/9916.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Foster, F Douglas & Viswanathan, S, 1990. "A Theory of the Interday Variations in Volume, Variance, and Trading Costs in Securities Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 3(4), pages 593-624.
    2. Foster, F Douglas & Viswanathan, S, 1993. "Variations in Trading Volume, Return Volatility, and Trading Costs: Evidence on Recent Price Formation Models," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(1), pages 187-211, March.
    3. Cornell, Bradford & Sirri, Erik R, 1992. "The Reaction of Investors and Stock Prices to Insider Trading," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 1031-1059, July.
    4. Kyle, Albert S & Wang, F Albert, 1997. "Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 2073-2090, December.
    5. Meulbroek, Lisa K, 1992. "An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(5), pages 1661-1699, December.
    6. Bhattacharya, Utpal & Spiegel, Matthew, 1991. "Insiders, Outsiders, and Market Breakdowns," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(2), pages 255-282.
    7. Holden, Craig W & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. "Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 247-270, March.
    8. Madhavan, Ananth, 1992. "Trading Mechanisms in Securities Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 607-641, June.
    9. Albert S. Kyle, 1989. "Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(3), pages 317-355.
    10. Vives Xavier, 1995. "The Speed of Information Revelation in a Financial Market Mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 178-204, October.
    11. Medrano, Luis Angel & Vives, Xavier, 2001. "Strategic Behavior and Price Discovery," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 221-248, Summer.
    12. Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer, 1988. "A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price Variability," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 3-40.
    13. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1991. "Sunshine Trading and Financial Market Equilibrium," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(3), pages 443-481.
    14. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1993. "Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(3), pages 473-506.
    15. Spiegel, Matthew & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. "Informed Speculation and Hedging in a Noncompetitive Securities Market," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(2), pages 307-329.
    16. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    17. Amihud, Yakov & Mendelson, Haim, 1987. "Trading Mechanisms and Stock Returns: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(3), pages 533-553, July.
    18. Bruno Biais & Pierre Hillion & Chester Spatt, 1999. "Price Discovery and Learning during the Preopening Period in the Paris Bourse," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1218-1248, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ledenyov, Dimitri O. & Ledenyov, Viktor O., 2015. "Wave function method to forecast foreign currencies exchange rates at ultra high frequency electronic trading in foreign currencies exchange markets," MPRA Paper 67470, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Biais, Bruno & Glosten, Larry & Spatt, Chester, 2005. "Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations, empirical results, and policy implications," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 217-264, May.
    3. Jiayi Li & Sumei Luo & Guangyou Zhou, 2021. "Call auction, continuous trading and closing price formation," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(6), pages 1037-1065, June.
    4. Estrada, Javier, 1994. "Insider trading: regulation, securities markets, and welfare under risk neutrality," UC3M Working papers. Economics 2922, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    5. Vayanos, Dimitri & Wang, Jiang, 2013. "Market Liquidity—Theory and Empirical Evidence ," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1289-1361, Elsevier.
    6. Dridi, Ramdan & Germain, Laurent, 2004. "Bullish/Bearish Strategies of Trading: A Nonlinear Equilibrium," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(4), pages 873-886, December.
    7. Bondarenko, Oleg, 2001. "Competing market makers, liquidity provision, and bid-ask spreads," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 269-308, June.
    8. Pascual, Roberto, 1999. "How does liquidity behave? A multidimensional analysis of NYSE stocks," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB 6433, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
    9. Qin Lei & Xuewu Wang, 2014. "Time†Varying Liquidity Trading, Private Information and Insider Trading," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 20(2), pages 321-351, March.
    10. Selma Boussetta, 2017. "The role of pre-opening mechanisms in fragmented markets," Post-Print hal-02156145, HAL.
    11. Takatoshi Ito & Richard K. Lyons & Michael T. Melvin, 1996. "Is There Private Information in the FX Market? The Tokyo Experiment," Working Papers _005, University of California at Berkeley, Haas School of Business.
    12. Berkman, Henk & Koch, Paul D., 2008. "Noise trading and the price formation process," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 232-250, March.
    13. Pascual, Roberto, 2000. "Adverse selection costs, trading activity and liquidity in the NYSE: an empirical analysis in a dynamic context," UC3M Working papers. Economics 7276, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    14. Cheng, Louis & Firth, Michael & Leung, T.Y. & Rui, Oliver, 2006. "The effects of insider trading on liquidity," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 467-483, November.
    15. Ariadna Dumitrescu, 2003. "Imperfect Competition and Market Liquidity with a Supply Informed Trader," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 591.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    16. Palan, Stefan & Stöckl, Thomas, 2017. "When chasing the offender hurts the victim: The case of insider legislation," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 104-129.
    17. Madhavan, Ananth, 2000. "Market microstructure: A survey," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 205-258, August.
    18. Deb, Pragyan & Koo, Bonsoo & Liu, Zijun, 2014. "Competition, premature trading and excess volatility," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 178-193.
    19. Estrada, Javier, 1995. "Insider trading: Regulation, securities markets, and welfare under risk aversion," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 421-449.
    20. Chow, Edward H. & Lee, Jie-Haun & Shyy, Gang, 1996. "Trading mechanisms and trading preferences on a 24-hour futures market: A case study of the Floor/GLOBEX switch on MATIF," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(10), pages 1695-1713, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric information; pre-opening; insider trading;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:1999016. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Virginie LEBLANC (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iruclbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.