Incidences du mode de prélèvement des cotisations sociales. Un modèle d'équilibre général avec revenu minimum

During the last twenty years, the rise in unemployment has been accompanied, in almost all OECD countries, by rising social security taxes. The resulting increase in the labour cost may have been unfavourable to hirings and have been one of the determinant factors of the persistence of high unemployment rates. In a general equilibrium model with exogenous minimum revenue and social security taxes, we show that the value of the real minimum wage depends on what basis (wage, profit or value added) social security taxes are levied. Whatever the basis, the presence of a minimum revenue implies a downwards rigidity of real wages and may cause unemployment. However, the choosen basis and the rate of taxation (when the basis is wage or value added) influence the level of unemployment. It is thus possible to reduce unemployment in changing either the rate of taxation or the basis of social security taxes. We consider various possibilities and draw under what conditions it is possible to stimulate employment without deteriorating the government budget.